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There are currently no widely accepted animal surveillance guidelines for human Ebola hemorrhagic fever
(EHF) outbreak investigations to identify potential sources of Ebolavirus (EBOV) spillover into humans and
other animals. Animal field surveillance during and following an outbreak has several purposes, from helping
identify the specific animal source of a human case to guiding control activities by describing the spatial and
temporal distribution of wild circulating EBOV, informing public health efforts, and contributing to broader
EHF research questions. Since 1976, researchers have sampled over 10,000 individual vertebrates from areas
associated with human EHF outbreaks and tested for EBOV or antibodies. Using field surveillance data
associated with EHF outbreaks, this review provides guidance on animal sampling for resource-limited
outbreak situations, target species, and in some cases which diagnostics should be prioritized to rapidly assess
the presence of EBOV in animal reservoirs. In brief, EBOV detection was 32.7% (18/55) for carcasses (animals
found dead) and 0.2% (13/5309) for live captured animals. Our review indicates that for the purposes of
identifying potential sources of transmission from animals to humans and isolating suspected virus in an
animal in outbreak situations, (1) surveillance of free-ranging non-human primate mortality and morbidity
should be a priority, (2) any wildlife morbidity or mortality events should be investigated and may hold the
most promise for locating virus or viral genome sequences, (3) surveillance of some bat species is worthwhile
to isolate and detect evidence of exposure, and (4) morbidity, mortality, and serology studies of domestic
animals should prioritize dogs and pigs and include testing for virus and previous exposure.
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O
n May 13, 2011, a 12 year-old girl from Zirowbe,
Uganda, was diagnosed with a strain of EBOV
most similar to Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV) (1).
The Ugandan government quickly convened a national
task force with a Ministry of Health-led outbreak
response team, which included the World Health Orga-
nization’s Regional Office for Africa (WHO/AFRO), the
United States Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC), and the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) as partners. As part of the
response, wildlife disease experts were asked to sample
both bats and non-human primates near the outbreak
site. This request prompted a discussion of historical
animal sampling results related to human EHFoutbreaks
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review. Our purpose is to help field teams during an EHF
outbreak identify animal species and sampling strategies
that will most likely yield a positive finding by targeting
species already implicated as potential reservoirs, vectors,
or hosts (dead-end or otherwise) as supported by
diagnostic data. This strategy carries the best chance of
elucidating the possible source of the human infection,
encountering a range of susceptible species within that
particular context, identifying potential reservoirs, and
effectively informing public health efforts.
Materials and methods
We began our review using ‘animal’, ‘wildlife’, and
‘Ebola’ as ISI Web of Knowledge search terms for
reports of animal sampling efforts associated with out-
breaks. Sampling efforts published in a peer-reviewed
publication comprised live capture or carcass sampling
efforts, during which vertebrate animals were collected
from an area associated with a human EHFoutbreak and
tested for EBOV or antibodies. Live capture efforts often
involved trapping and euthanizing live animals, whereas
carcass-sampling efforts involved sampling animals that
were found dead. Sampling event locations and years
were recorded. Data from multiple publications were
merged when it was apparent that they reported on the
same sampling effort. Samples were sorted by diagnostic
assay type, and if the assay type was not disclosed the
study was excluded from further analysis. Diagnostic tests
that directly detected the EBOV infection were often
conducted with histopathologic examination of tissues or
involved virus isolation in Vero cell culture, antigen
capture assays, and virus-specific PCR (2, 3). Antibody
tests used to detect previous exposure to EBOV included
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) targeting
virus-specific host immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies
(4). We classified EBOV detection assays into the two
broad detection categories, virus or antibody, without
adjusting for their specific reliability or validity, which
has changed dramatically over the past 35 years. We
considered an animal EBOV-positive after a single
positive test. Further documentation of EBOV diagnos-
tics is provided in the Appendix and the original
publications. Each diagnostic test result was counted
independently and in some cases both antibody and virus
detection tests were carried out on one animal and
therefore counted as two test samples. Species counts
were estimated within each order. Sets of animals that
were reported as unclassified were grouped and consid-
ered to come from one species. Scientific names were
standardized according to Mammal Species of the World,
3rd edition, taxonomy (5).
Our analysis focused on animal sampling strategies
associated with human EHF outbreak investigations to
identify potential sources of EBOV spillover into humans
and other animals, which may further propagate trans-
mission cycles. This objective is distinct from prospective
surveillance of natural EBOV reservoir species and
sylvatic cycles, which would ideally be carried out prior
to outbreaks.
Results
Live animal and carcass sampling
We evaluated 14 reports of outbreak related sampling
efforts, nine targeting live animals and five targeting
carcasses, with test results available in peer reviewed
journals, covering the period 19762011. Sampling efforts
had a basic structure in common with adaptations for
each specific outbreak. During an outbreak event,
national authorities permitted teams of zoologists and
veterinarians to trap, and in at least three instances, hunt
individual animals for testing (2, 6, 7). The length of time
between a reported human case and the first sampling
ranged from 2 months prior to 22 months post outbreak
(Table 1). Small game animals were also collected from
bushmeat markets and researchers occasionally used
payment schemes to target collection of specific species
in villages (2, 6). Rodents, if sampled, were collected with
Sherman and pitfall traps on trap lines and point sites,
dispersed near the outbreak and hospital treatment areas
(6). Bats were captured with mist nets (which are more
effective in capturing some species of bats than others) at
sampling sites that were not always located adjacent to an
outbreak event (810). Unfortunately data were not
always available to differentiate which bats were caught
in which location, and therefore our analysis uses the
pooled data from these sampling efforts (9, 10). Most live
captured animals were euthanized in the field (2, 6, 7).
General baseline data included location of sample
(latitude and longitude), sample type (blood, tissue
etc.), genus, species, identification number, sex, age,
weight, morphometric measurements, and body condi-
tion. Researchers also detected carcasses often with the
help of local people (1113). For diagnostics, there was a
lack of consistency in gene targets (e.g., polymerase,
glycoprotein, and nucleoprotein) and procedures used for
reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) and molecular
characterization. Publication of outbreak related animal
sampling data from the 1970s through the present was
delayed on average 3.4 years (Table 1). Six papers
reported complementary information on two separate
sets of animal sampling efforts (7, 1115).
The average sample size of a live capture sampling
effort was 1,214 individual animals and comprised 184
species, whereas the mean sample size of a carcass
sampling effort was 19 individual carcasses comprised
of 110 species. Together, researchers using both live and
carcass sampling methods collected and tested 13,404
samples, representing roughly 158 species. In total, EBOV
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animal samples and 12 species. All sampling efforts
were tested for the Zaı ¨re ebolavirus (ZEBOV) subtype,
with the exceptions of those collected by Taniguchi et al.,
which reported for Reston ebolavirus (REBOV) subtype
(16). The paucity of sampling and testing for SEBOV
versus ZEBOVreflects the smaller overall numberof EHF
outbreaks in humans attributed to SEBOV.
Live capture samples were dominated by species from
the Chiroptera (bat) and Rodentia (rodent) orders, fol-
lowed by non-human primates and birds. The live capture
prevalence of EBOV was 2.2% (180/8,050) for antibody
tests and 0.2% (13/5,309) for virus detection (Table 2).
The prevalence of EBOV in animal carcasses found
and opportunistically sampled in association with human
outbreaks was 32.7% (18/55; Table 2). Overall carcass
samples represented just 0.4% (55/13,404) of the collec-
tion but 58.1% (18/31) of positive virus detection samples.
Two thirds of the carcasses collected were non-
human primates, including gorillas, chimpanzees, and
Cercopithecus cephus (Moustached Guenon). Fifty-nine
percent (13/22) of gorilla and 50.0% (4/8) of chimpanzee
carcasses tested positive for EBOV (Table 3). While
antigen detection, immunohistochemical staining, and
molecular tests identified EBOV, tests of degraded muscle
tissue from these gorilla and chimpanzee carcasses have
yet to detect EBOV specific IgG antibodies, an indication
that animals may not have mounted an IgG immune
response to the infection (11, 12, 14). EBOV was detected
in 16.7% (1/6) of duiker (Cephalophus sp.) carcasses and
there are no published accounts of Chiroptera (bat) or
Rodentia (rodent) carcass sampling (Table 3). The rate of
carcass decay in the tropics is 47 days, with only bones
present beyond 21 days (12,17). RT-PCR successfully
detected EBOV genetic material in bone marrow from
carcasses (skulls and long bones) 1 week to 1 year post
mortem (12).
The yield by order, assay, and sampling method for
species with a minimum of one positive EBOV test is
shown in Table 3. EBOV antibody tests were used on
60.0% (8,040/13,404) of samples and virus detection tests
on 40.0% (5,364/13,404; Table 2). Notably, 26% (3,474/
13,349) of all live capture samples were not tested with
the newer ELISA or PCR methods used to test carcass
samples. If newer methods have fewer false negatives, our
results could underestimate the true prevalence in live
capture samples.
Domestic animal sampling
Efforts targeting domestic animals (cow, goat, sheep,
pig, and dog) represented 0.9% (114/13,404) of all samples
in the collection (Appendix C). With the exception of
Table 1. Vertebrate sampling efforts associated with EHF outbreaks
Years of
sampling(s) Location Method Assay
Subtype(s)
assayed
a Reference
Year
published
Sampling
delay (months)
1976 DRC
b, Yambuku Live Virus Z 7 1978 2
1976 DRC, Yambuku Live Virus Z 15 1978 2
19791980 DRC
c Live Both Z 2 1999 22
1995 DRC, Kikwitt Live Both Z,S,R 6 1999 7
1996 Gabon, Booue ´ Carcass Virus NA 27 1997 NA
19852000 Gabon & RoC
d Carcass Virus Z 14 2004 NA
2001 Gabon & RoC
e Carcass Virus Z 11 2004 1
20012002 Gabon
f Live Antibody Z 34
g 2005 NA
2002, 2003 Gabon & RoC
h Live Both Z 8 2005 4
20012003 Gabon & RoC Carcass Virus Z 12 2005 2
20032006 Gabon & RoC Live Antibody Z 9 2007 20
20012006 Gabon & RoC Carcass Virus Z 13 2007 0
2003, 2005,
2006, 2008
Gabon & RoC Live Antibody Z 10 2009 0
20082009 Philippines Live Antibody R 16 2011 6
aZ, S, and R indicate an assay for EBOV subtype Zaı ¨re, Sudan, or Reston respectively. NA indicates an observation was not available.
bDemocratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaı ¨re).
cYalosemba, Tandala (DRC).
dRepublic of Congo.
eZadie region (Gabon) and Lossi Sanctuary (RoC).
fMkeambo, Ekata, and Mazingo.
gData from human cases and animal source locations.
hEkata (Gabon) and Mbomo (RoC).
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tested negative for EBOV (Appendix A, B, and C).
Only dog samples were tested for EBOV antibody, which
was detected at 26.3% (21/80) prevalence. Conversely,
the overall antibody detection prevalence was 2.0%
(159/7,960) for wild species (Appendix A). The 80 dog
(Canis lupus familiaris) samples were collected during two
sampling efforts associated with human outbreaks in
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 19791980 and
Gabon 20012002 (Appendix A). The 12 pig (Sus scrofa)
samples tested were collected during the DRC
Yambuku 1976 and DRC Kikwit 1995 human outbreaks
(Appendix B).
Trends in EHF outbreak animal sampling
Some of the first EHF outbreak animal sampling efforts
targeted a wide range of vertebrates and arthropods, but
analysis of the samples consistently failed to detect
EBOV. Scientists were performing sampling efforts to
search for the EBOV reservoir, or ‘one or more epide-
miologically connected populations or environments in
which the pathogen can be permanently maintained and
from which infection is transmitted to the defined target
population’ (18). Following the first medically recognized
outbreak in 1976, up through the 1990s, tests for EBOV
in both domestic and wild animals were uniformly
negative. One study sampled nearly 28,000 arthropods,
and another study sampled over 3,000 vertebrates with-
out identifying a single positive sample (6, 19).
There are several possible explanations as to why early
sampling efforts were unable to detect evidence of EBOV
in animal reservoirs. First, the early animal tests relied
solely on Vero cell cultures to isolate the virus, because
antigen and molecular detection assays were not yet
developed. These latter methods have proven to be less
dependent on sample quality and may be more sensitive.
Second, the total sample size of these studies was large,
but the samples were spread across numerous species
that, in hindsight, were unlikely reservoirs (2). Lastly,
when the sampling effort was conducted months after a
presumed index transmission event from animals to
humans, seasonal shifts in habitat between the wet and
dry season and natural patterns of animal migration
meant the reservoir species may have left the outbreak
site or high levels of enzootic transmission in reservoirs
may have ceased (20, 21).
Non-human primate sampling
Non-human primate susceptibility to EBOV was evident
in the scientific literature. EBOV belongs to the same
Table 2. Number of animals sampled from 1976 through 2011 in association with EHF outbreaks
Live capture Carcass
Antibody Virus Virus
Order/totals No.  Yield No.  Yield No.  Yield
Total
No. species 126 9 129 3 10 3
No. samples 8040 180 2.2% 5309 13 0.2% 55 18 32.7%
Positive findings
Artiodactyla 23 0 0.0% 58 0 0.0% 13 1 7.7%
Carnivora 87 21 24.1% 49 0 0.0% 6 0 0.0%
Chiroptera 4883 158 3.2% 1418 13 0.9%
Non-human primates 275 0 0.0% 285 0 0.0% 33 17 51.5%
Rodentia 2431 1 0.04% 2540 0 0.0%
Null findings
Afrosoricida 5 0 0.0%
Hyracoidea 7 0 0.0% 7 0 0.0%
Macroscelidae 28 0 0.0% 29 0 0.0%
Pholidota 66 0 0.0% 95 0 0.0%
Proboscidea 2 0 0.0%
Soricomorpha 105 0 0.0% 123 0 0.0%
Mammal unspecified 20 0 0.0% 124 0 0.0%
Non-mammals
Class Aves 85 0 0.0% 421 0 0.0%
Class Reptilia 30 0 0.0% 155 0 0.0%
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Method (Assay) Live capture (Antibody) Live capture (Virus) Carcass sampling (Virus)
Order/subtotals No.  Yield No.  Yield No.  Yield References
Total 2161 111 5.1% 355 8 2.3% 36 18 50.0%
Artiodactyla (n12)
a
Cephalophus sp. 6 1 16.7% 11, 12, 13
Philantomba monticola 17 0 0.0% 28 0 0.0% 6, 7, 15
Sylvicapra grimmia 4 0 0.0% 6
Subtotal 17 0 0.0% 32 0 0.0% 6 1 16.7%
Carnivora (n10)
Canis lupus familiaris 80 21 26.3% 14 0 0.0% 2, 34
Chiroptera (n47)
Epomops franqueti 1670 69 4.1% 140 5 3.6% 8, 9, 10
Hypsignathus monstrosus 253 18 7.1% 22 4 18.2% 8, 9, 10
Micropterus pusillus 275 4 1.5% 78 0 0.0% 10
Mops (Mops) condylurus 64 0 0.0% 10
Mops (Mops) condylurus & Hipposideros gigas
b 24 3 12.5% 10
Myonycteris (Myonycteris) torquata 1185 33 2.8% 141 4 2.8% 8, 9, 10
Roussetus aegyptiacus 307 24 7.8% 10
Rousettus (Rousettus) amplexicaudatus 16 7 43.8% 16
Subtotal 2060 89 4.3% 305 8 2.6%
Non-human primates (n15)
Gorrilla gorilla 22 13 59.1% 11, 12, 13
Pan troglodytes 8 4 50.0% 11, 12, 13, 27
Subtotal 30 17 56.7%
Rodentia (n47)
Anomalurus derbianus 4 1 25.0% 4 0 0% 2
aTotal number of species sampled within an order.
bStudy counted both Mops condylurus and Hiposideros gigas.
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)virus family as Marburgvirus, and a Marburg hemor-
rhagic fever outbreak had been linked to green monkeys
(Chlorocebus aethiops) 9 years prior to the first recog-
nized EHFoutbreak in Yambuku, DRC (22). However, it
was not until the early nineties that evidence again hinted
that non-human primates provided a transmission link
between the sylvatic cycle of the virus and human
outbreaks. Late in 1989 outbreaks of REBOV, at that
time a new strain of EBOV, occurred in non-human
primate quarantine centers in the United States, puta-
tively killing monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) imported
from the Philippines and causing seroconversion but no
disease in humans who handled the monkeys (2325). In
November 1994 a natural outbreak of EHF occurred in
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)i nT a ı ¨ National Park, Co ˆte
d’Ivoire, and a researcher who necropsied an ape carcass
became infected with another new subtype of EBOV,
Co ˆte d’Ivoire ebolavirus (CIEBOV) (26). Around that
same time in Gabon a set of three human EHFoutbreaks
began that coincided with deaths of non-human primates.
The index human cases of the last outbreak in Gabon, in
the spring of 1996, had a history of butchering chimpan-
zees. A chimpanzee carcass found near the hunting
grounds of an index case tested positive for EBOV by
an immunohistochemical skin biopsy (27).
The importance of the human-great ape interface was
further supported during another series of outbreaks in
Gabon from 2001 through 2003. Leroy and colleagues
were able to trace ‘epidemic chains’ back to 10 index
cases, all hunters who had handled a gorilla, chimpanzee,
or duiker carcass (11). While the carcasses at the head of
the epidemic chains could not be sampled, in sum the
researchers were able to confirm 64 carcasses and
sample 36 within a 2-hour walking distance of villages:
22 gorillas (13 positive), eight chimpanzees (four
positive), and six duikers (one positive) (1114).
Epidemiological evidence shows that hunting of great
apes is an important transmission interface, yet their role
as a natural reservoir remains unlikely. One study
between 1985 and 2000 showed the IgG ELISA based
seroprevalence of EBOV in captive-born non-human
primates was 0% (0/165) compared to 6.3% (39/618) in
wild-caught captive non-human primates, with chimpan-
zees representing three quarters of the positives in
Cameroon, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo (14).
The wild-caught captive non-human primate species that
tested positive for EBOV specific IgG antibodies were
Cercopithecus neglectus (De Brazza’s Monkey), Gorrilla
gorilla (Western Gorilla), Mandrillus leucophaeus (Drill),
Mandrillus sphinx (Mandrill), Pan troglodytes (Chimpan-
zee), and Papio anubis (Olive Baboon). The study’s
authors concluded that non-lethal EBOV naturally
circulated in the area prior to human exposure (14).
Within non-human primates to date just gorilla,
chimpanzee, and Cercopithecus cephus (Mustached
Guenon) carcasses have been sampled, and only gorilla
and chimpanzees have tested positive for EBOV by RT-
PCR. In this light, and in addition to the high mortality
rates of gorillas and chimpanzees, some researchers
concluded that non-human primates are not the natural
EBOV reservoir (12, 13, 28, 29). Explanations for the
presence of EBOV antibody in some populations and
outright mortality in other populations may include
individual differences in protective immunological re-
sponses (30), differential virulence of emerging EBOV
strains, or differences in transmission pathways.
Chiroptera (bat) sampling
Strong circumstantial evidence implicates bats as a
natural EBOV reservoir. A bat reservoir was suspected
early on when bat roosts were observed in a cotton
warehouse at the center of EHF outbreaks in Nzara,
Sudan (31). Swanepoel et al. experimentally inoculated 19
vertebrate species with EBOVand demonstrated that only
bats became infected and shed the virus in feces, strongly
suggesting them as a potential reservoir (32). In 2004
researchers in South East Asia and Australia established
that fruit bats could transmit Nipahvirus and Hendravirus
(33). Researchers have since found 151 individual bats
from six species were seropositive for EBOV antibodies:
Epopmops franqueti (Franquet’s Epauletted Fruit Bat),
Hypsignathus monstrosus (Hammer-headed Fruit Bat),
Micropterus pusillus (Peters’s Lesser Epauletted Fruit
Bat), Mops (Mops) condylurus (Angolan Free-tailed
Bat), Myonycteris (Myonycteris) torquata (Little Collared
Fruit Bat), and Rousettus (Rousettus) aegyptiacus (Egyp-
tian Rousette or Fruit Bat) (see Appendix A, 8, 9, 10). In
2009, following an outbreak linked to the Kitaka Cave,
Uganda, comprehensive evidence from epidemiological
observations, serological and genetic testing, and virus
isolation identified Rousettus (Rousettus) aegyptiacus as a
natural Marburg virus reservoir (34). The close genetic
relationship between Marburg virus and EBOV suggests
that bat species may also be reservoirs for EBOV, but
other potential reservoir species have not been ruled out.
Very recently REBOVantibodies were found in Rousettus
(Rousettus) amplexicaudatus in the Philippines following a
disease outbreak in pigs (16). While mounting serologic
and PCR evidence points towards bats as natural EBOV
reservoirs, researchers have not isolated any strain of
EBOV from naturally infected bats.
Discussion
We describe the cumulative history of published EHF
outbreak animal sampling data assayed for ZEBOV and
exposure to ZEBOV. The data were collected from 14
peer-reviewed publications and analyzed for general
trends over time, sampling method, assay type, and
domesticated status. Over time the list of target wildlife
species narrowed and sampling of domesticated animals
Sarah H. Olson et al.
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and live bats as important primary routes of exposure to
humans and bats as putative EBOV reservoirs (35).
In outbreak situations, field response teams and
researchers can use the recommendations presented here
to confirm exposure to EBOV in animals, potentially
detect the source of immediate spillover, and improve our
knowledge of implicated animal species by targeting high
yield vertebrate species with optimized sampling ap-
proaches that reduce destructive animal sampling, espe-
cially for wild species whose distributions are poorly
documented and may be rare. When trying to identify
natural cycles of EBOV in free-ranging wildlife during
non-outbreak situations, broader surveillance strategies
may still be appropriate. In either situation, the tables and
appendices provide quick reference for sample strategies
and we report prevalence for sampling efforts by species,
EBOV assay, and sampling method. These values should
be used as starting points, as they may over- or under-
estimate the true value depending on the reliability and
validity of each assay as performed by different labs.
Our analysis, combined with new insights, suggests
some species have not been sampled sufficiently and
should be targeted in the future. Allela and colleagues
present a strong gradient of distance and antibody
prevalence in dogs, yet no follow up study has sampled
dogs for ZEBOV (36). More recently REBOV was
detected in domestic pigs in the Philippines, and labora-
tory studies confirmed domestic pigs are susceptible to
ZEBOV infection, shed the virus in large quantities, and
can infect co-housed pigs (37, 38). No trace of EBOV was
found in the 12 domestic swine (Sus scrofa domesticus)
that were sampled in 1976 and 1995 in the DRC. Future
sampling efforts should include wild and domestic pigs in
greater numbers. While it seems unlikely that domestic
animals, or their wild suid or canid relatives, are the
natural reservoir of EBOV, they may become sources of
new infections when infected by spillover from a reservoir
species or from human cases.
Our results show that testing of dead wild animals for
EBOV should not be neglected and may improve our
knowledge regarding the full range of dead end hosts.
Opportunistic sampling of carcasses may be a low
hanging fruit to investigate alternative transmission
pathways as carcass sampling has so far yielded the
highest prevalence of virus detection, over 150 times more
than live capture. Across all the sampling efforts we show
the virus was present in 1% of live capture bat samples
and 52% of gorilla and chimpanzee carcass samples
collected in association with a human EHF outbreak.
Animals acting sick or debilitated should also be targeted
for sampling as not all hosts have succumbed to EBOV
infection (14). In the face of human outbreaks, quickly
determining if the virus is present in animals (wild
or domestic) will help investigators understand the
transmission dynamics in these populations and possible
infection sources during a human outbreak, focus on
factors associated with spillover risk (e.g., seasonality,
geography), and inform public health efforts.
We recognize that it is possible that a natural reservoir
species for EBOV, such as bats are considered, may not
exhibit high mortality levels with infection, and therefore
live sampling is an important component for determining
their role in the spillover event in question. In addition,
even if the natural reservoir species exhibits high mortal-
ity levels with infection their carcasses may be difficult to
find in some field conditions due to their small size and
rapid decomposition.
Briefly reflecting on the quality of the data provided in
the published literature, there are easy steps researchers
can take to improve our collective knowledge of zoonotic
disease ecology. Presently data are scattered, unorganized,
incomplete, and static. Published tables are truncated for
space and often lack individual sample information, such
as the specific date, location, or assays performed. These
samples are extremely valuable, but there is no centralized
tracking of what tests have been run at which labs or
where they are currently located. New techniques and
assays are emerging rapidly and revisiting the freezer of
20 years ago may tell us something important that was
missed the first time. Researchers should consider collect-
ing and reporting a proxy of field sampling effort, such as
the number of sampling days, or the GPS track length.
This information is particularly useful to statistical
modelers to allow adjustment for sampling biases.
Standardizing RT-PCR genetic targets will also improve
downstream genetic analysis, but at minimum samples
should be taken and preserved with standard protocols
to maximize the possibilities for future analysis.
Another observation was that overall reporting pro-
gress has improved, delay in publication of EBOV testing
results dropped from 20 to 2 years, and a model of
standardized wildlife disease data collection terminology
was recently developed by the USAID PREDICT project
(39). On the front end, surveillance teams are on the
ground shortly after outbreak events. On the back end
quickly circulating all surveillance findings to the scien-
tific community can help promote adaptive surveillance
strategies.
All surveillance includes both positive and negative
findings. One caveat to our analysis is that when negative
results are left unpublished the conclusions can be
‘dangerously misleading’ (40). Although the track record
of publishing null results in EHF research is impressive
(31,000 arthropods and vertebrates negative for EBOV
and counting) it is possible that field investigators,
authors, or editors failed to publish results because
they were fatigued by response activities and negative
findings. Similarly only carcasses of a few species have
been tested.
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future studies. Why are animal carcass sampling efforts
limited to a handful of species? Why were duikers
involved and did other animals die as a result of EBOV
infections? Are carcasses of different species detected at
the same rate? Does bat mortality occur? Have dogs or
pigs been sources of human infection?
The challenge of identifying EBOV spillover species is
real, but this extensive literature review offers some
guidance towards top priorities (Table 4). First, our
review indicates that the field team should not overlook
the importance of sampling and testing dogs and pigs for
EBOV and previous exposure as part of an overall
response strategy. Second, all wildlife morbidity or
mortality events in wildlife, and especially (although by
no means exclusively) non-human primates should be
reported and investigated. Our analysis shows EBOV is
most likely to be recovered from free-ranging species by
opportunistically sampling dead animals. Carcass sam-
pling yields much higher recovery rates of EBOV than
live capture sampling. Lastly, our findings also support
the importance of bat surveillance in the hunt for the
definitive reservoir, but encourage careful sample size
planning, as the likelihood of finding evidence of EBOV
in bats is very low.
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